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Interpreting bills of rights: The value of a 
comparative approach 
Jack Tsen-Ta Lee* 
This is a pre-publication version of the article that has been published as (2007) 5 International 
Journal of Constitutional Law 122–152. The text is the same as the published version, which can be 
accessed on-line from http://icon.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/reprint/5/1/122?ijkey= 
SQaLFMxbabuy9uz&keytype= ref, except for minor differences in the footnotes. 
In certain jurisdictions, among them Malaysia, Singapore, and the United 
States, the practice of consulting comparative legal materials in interpreting 
domestic bills of rights has been criticized as illegitimate. This article 
examines four main concerns: (1) the texts of bills of rights—the argument 
that a bill of rights is to be interpreted within its own “four walls” and not in 
the light of analogies drawn from other jurisdictions; (2) national identity—
the argument that a bill of rights embodies the values of a nation’s people, and 
it is wrong to refer to foreign experiences to determine such values; (3) 
different domestic conditions—the argument that comparative legal materials 
do not reflect local economic, political, social, or other conditions that differ 
from those in other jurisdictions; and (4) certain practical concerns. The 
article concludes that, notwithstanding these concerns, there are sound 
justifications for courts to take a comparative approach to the interpretation 
of bills of rights and substantial benefits to be derived from such an approach. 
The reception of foreign legal institutions is not a matter of 
nationality, but of usefulness and need. No one bothers to fetch 
a thing from afar when he has one as good or better at home, 
but only a fool would refuse quinine just because it didn’t grow 
in his back garden.1 
— RUDOLF VON JHERING, 1818–1892 
While it seems a widespread practice in common law jurisdictions for courts to refer 
in their judgments to legal material from other jurisdictions, particularly those with 
which they share a similar heritage, on closer examination, this assertion turns out to 
be rather an overstatement. It is true insofar as traditional common law subjects, 
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1 RUDOLF VON JHERING, GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN RECHTS AUF DEN VERSCHIEDENEN STUFEN SEINER 
ENTWICKLUNG [THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW AT DIFFERENT STAGES OF ITS DEVELOPMENT], Part I, 8f (B. 
Schwabe 9th ed. 1955), cited in KONRAD ZWEIGERT & HEIN KÖTZ, INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW 
17 (Tony Weir trans., Clarendon 3d rev. ed. 1998). 
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such as contract and tort law, are concerned but less so for constitutional and human 
rights law. In fact, in certain jurisdictions, among them Malaysia, Singapore, and the 
United States, some quarters are decidedly skeptical about the legitimacy of 
consulting comparative materials in relation to these latter areas of the law. In 
November 2005, U.S. Attorney General Alberto Gonzales expressed concern over 
what he saw as the “growing tendency” of judges to interpret the Constitution by 
reference to foreign law, which, he said, might “undermine the long tradition of 
reverence that Americans have for the supreme law of the land.”2 
This skepticism is curious, for it seems useful for a court to refer to foreign 
legal material—including cases, legislation, and academic writings—for several 
reasons. For instance, a court may use comparative material to shed light on the 
effect that should be given to the text of a bill of rights in its own jurisdiction, 
especially where the point has not yet arisen in the local context, or it is contended 
that previous interpretations are flawed. The reference may be fairly superficial; for 
instance, the experiences of foreign jurisdictions may be cited as indicative of 
international trends generally, or trends among established democratic nations, to 
support or disavow a particular approach taken by the court. Alternatively, a court 
may identify a doctrine of foreign law and apply it in articulating the meaning of the 
text of a domestic bill of rights, with suitable modifications if necessary. In addition, 
a court may find foreign law valuable not for its substantive content but for its 
general approach to the interpretive enterprise, enabling it to rationalize its own 
approach to interpreting its own country’s bill of rights. 
                                                   
2  Alberto R. Gonzales, Prepared Remarks, Address at the University of Chicago Law School 2 
(Nov. 9, 2005) available at http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/Attorney-General-Foreign-Law-
Speech. Transcript also available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2005/ag_speech_0511092. 
html (websites last visited Oct. 5, 2006). 
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This article examines why the use of comparative material for these purposes 
has been criticized as illegitimate. Specifically, four main concerns are dealt with. 
The first is one based on the texts of bills of rights. Under this heading we will 
consider whether a court is justified in declining to consider comparative material on 
the ground that the text of a foreign bill of rights differs from that of the domestic 
charter. This concern has particularly held sway in the Commonwealth republics of 
Malaysia and Singapore. On the other hand, in the United States the principal 
concern appears to be that since a bill of rights reflects the identity and values of the 
nation, it is inappropriate to look to the experience of other countries. We will 
examine that concern, as well as two other concerns based on varying domestic 
conditions in different jurisdictions and the practicality of referring to foreign law. It 
is concluded that there are, in fact, sound justifications for courts taking a 
comparative approach to the interpretation of bills of rights. 
1. Concern based on the text: The “four walls” doctrine 
In 1963, the chief justice of the Federation of Malaya stated in Government of the 
State of Kelantan v. Government of the Federation of Malaya that the Malayan 
Federal Constitution was “primarily to be interpreted within its own four walls and 
not in light of the analogies drawn from other countries such as Great Britain, the 
United States of America or Australia.”3 This statement appeared in a short judgment 
delivered on the eve of the coming into force of the Malaysia Act 1963 (U.K.),4 which, 
as the history books tell us, resulted in the merger of the Federation of Malaya and 
the British colonies of North Borneo (Sabah), Sarawak, and Singapore to form the 
new Federation of Malaysia and, thus, the independence of the colonies from Great 
                                                   
3  Gov. of Kelantan v. Gov. of Malaya, [1963] 1 M.L.J. 355, 358 (Mal.). 
4  Malaysia Act [1963] c. 35. 
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Britain. The case was the result of an attempt by the state of Kelantan, then a 
member of the Federation of Malaya, to block the merger and thus the formation of 
Malaysia. 
In these circumstances of urgency, Chief Justice James Thomson can perhaps 
be forgiven for neither describing the analogies from foreign jurisdictions that he 
declined to apply to the Malayan Constitution, nor explaining clearly what he meant 
by an interpretation within the four walls of a constitution. However, in support of 
his statement, he referred to Adegbenro v. Akintola,5 a judgment of the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council on appeal from the Supreme Court of Nigeria that 
had been rendered less than three months earlier. There, Viscount Radcliffe, 
delivering their lordships’ judgment, said:6 
[T]he Constitution of Western Nigeria is now contained in a written 
instrument in which it has been sought to formulate with precision the powers 
and duties of the various agencies that it holds in balance. That instrument 
now stands in its own right; and, while it may well be useful on occasions to 
draw on British practice or doctrine in interpreting a doubtful phrase whose 
origin can be traced or to study decisions on the Constitutions of Australia or 
the United States where federal issues are involved, it is in the end the 
wording of the Constitution itself that is to be interpreted and applied, and 
this wording can never be overridden by the extraneous principles of other 
Constitutions which are not explicitly incorporated in the formulae that have 
been chosen as the frame of this Constitution. 
If Chief Justice Thomson’s statement was to be understood in the light of 
Adegbenro v. Akintola, then Government of the State of Kelantan stands for the 
proposition that foreign principles of law should not be applied if they cannot be 
accommodated by the constitutional text. The rule ensures that the text is not 
ignored. 
                                                   
5  Adegbenro v. Akintola, [1963] A.C. 614, [1963] 3 W.L.R. 63 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Nig.). 
6  Id., [1963] A.C. at 631–632. 
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Although the “four walls” theory or doctrine (as it has been termed by 
academics)7 has been applied repeatedly by the courts of Malaysia8 and Singapore, it 
does not appear to have been understood in the manner suggested above. As regards 
Singapore, the doctrine was reiterated by the Privy Council almost twenty years after 
Government of the State of Kelantan in Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor,9 when 
the Privy Council was still Singapore’s court of final resort. In that case it was 
submitted, on the appellants’ behalf, that a rebuttable presumption created by the 
Misuse of Drugs Act 1973 conflicted with the “presumption of innocence,” which was 
claimed to be a fundamental human right protected by articles 9(1) and 12(1) of the 
Singapore Constitution.10 Article 9(1) prohibits the deprivation of life or personal 
liberty save in accordance with law, while article 12(1) guarantees all persons equality 
before the law and equal protection of the law. The appellants’ counsel submitted 
that in interpreting these articles reference should be made to cases from India and 
the United States, among others. Lord Diplock, in delivering the judgment of the 
Court that dismissed the appeal, expressed the view that the two articles differed 
considerably in their language from the corresponding provisions of the Indian 
Constitution in that the former were much less detailed. Articles 9(1) and 12(1) 
                                                   
7  Li-ann Thio, The Secular Trumps the Sacred: Constitutional Issues Arising from Colin Chan 
v. Public Prosecutor, 16 SING. L. REV. 26, 62 (1995); Li-ann Thio, Recent Constitutional Developments: 
Of Shadows and Whips, Race, Rifts and Rights, Terror and Tudungs, Women and Wrongs, SING. J. 
LEGAL STUD. 328, 347 (2002); Victor V. Ramraj, Comparative Constitutional Law in Singapore, 6 
SING. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 302 (2002); Li-ann Thio, Pragmatism and Realism Do Not Mean Abdication: 
A Critical and Empirical Inquiry into Singapore’s Engagement with International Human Rights 
Law, 8 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 41, 59 (2004). 
8  Loh Kooi Choon v. Gov’t of Malaysia, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 187 (Fed. Ct.) (Mal.); Phang Chin Hock v. 
Public Prosecutor, [1980] 1 M.L.J. 70 (Fed. Ct.) (Mal.); Public Prosecutor v. Pung Chen Choon, [1994] 
1 M.L.J. 566 (Sup. Ct.) (Mal.). See also Public Prosecutor v. Ooi Kee Saik, [1971] 2 M.L.J. 108 (High 
Ct.) (Mal.). 
9  Ong Ah Chuan v. Public Prosecutor, [1981] A.C. 648, [1980] 3 W.L.R. 855, [1980–1981] S.L.R. 
48; [1981] 1 M.L.J. 64 (P.C.) (appeal taken from Sing.). 
10  SING. CONST. (1999) revised edition; available at http://statutes.agc.gov.sg. 
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differed even more widely from the Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution. 
Thus: 
[i]n view of these differences their Lordships are of opinion that decisions of 
Indian Courts on Pt III of the Indian Constitution should be approached with 
caution as guides to the interpretation of individual articles in Pt IV of the 
Singapore Constitution; and that decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States on that country’s Bill of Rights, whose phraseology is now 
nearly two hundred years old, are of little help in construing provisions of the 
Constitution of Singapore or other modern Commonwealth constitutions 
which follow broadly the Westminster model.11 
Following this lead, the four walls doctrine has been applied in various 
Singapore cases. In Att’y-Gen. v. Wain (No. 1),12 the respondents, who were facing an 
action for contempt by scandalizing the court after the publication of a news article in 
the Asian Wall Street Journal, sought to rely on decisions from Canada and other 
Commonwealth jurisdictions relating to freedom of speech. The judge held that the 
Canadian decisions did not constitute useful authority “for they are decisions based 
on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms which has no parallel in 
Singapore.”13 As regards the cases from other parts of the Commonwealth, the judge 
said that: 
though they make interesting reading, I find that so many of them turn on 
their own facts. As is to be expected, the judges in making their decisions in 
those cases were concerned with the social, political, industrial and other 
economic conditions prevailing in their respective societies at the particular 
time. It is therefore difficult to reconcile or to rationalize the many different 
and conflicting views expressed by the judges in their decision-making 
process. At best the cases only serve as illustrations of the application of the 
law of contempt in those countries.14 
In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew,15 a defamation case, the 
appellant invited the court to consider freedom-of-speech guarantees in bills of rights 
from jurisdictions such as Canada, India, and the United States, as well as article 10 
                                                   
11  [1981] A.C. at 669, [1980–1981] S.L.R. at 60–61, para. 22. 
12  Att’y-Gen. v. Wain (No. 1), [1991] S.L.R. 383, [1991] 2 M.L.J. 525 (High Ct.) (Sing.). 
13  Id., [1991] S.L.R. at 393, paras. 31–32. 
14  Id. 
15  Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. Lee Kuan Yew, [1992] 2 S.L.R. 310 (C.A.) (Sing.). 
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of the European Convention on Human Rights. He submitted that article 14(1) of the 
Singapore Constitution, which protects freedom of speech and expression, required 
defamation law to be modified such that the defense of qualified privilege would 
pertain to the publication of defamatory statements relating to the official conduct or 
performance of public duties by public officials or candidates for public office. The 
defense attached, he claimed, when such statements were made by those who had an 
honest and legitimate interest in the matter to those who had a corresponding and 
legitimate interest, whether as electors or as citizens potentially affected by the 
conduct of public officials. Two leading cases—the decision of the U.S. Supreme 
Court in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan16 and that of the European Court of Human 
Rights in Lingens v. Austria 17 —were heavily relied upon. The Court of Appeal 
declined to consider this submission, holding that the terms of article 14 differed 
materially from the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S. Constitution and 
from article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
Singapore courts continued to apply the four walls doctrine even after appeals 
to the Privy Council were completely abolished with effect from April 8, 1994,18 and 
the Court of Appeal became Singapore’s final appellate court. Chan Hiang Leng 
Colin v. Public Prosecutor19  concerned orders by the Minister for Home Affairs 
banning as undesirable all publications of the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, 
which produced materials for the Jehovah’s Witnesses. The case involved a challenge 
to the validity of these orders on the ground that they were contrary to the freedom of 
religion protected by article 15 of the Singapore Constitution. In response to an 
                                                   
16  New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
17  Lingens v. Austria, 8 Eur. H.R. Rep. 407 (1986) (Eur. Ct. H.R.). 
18  With the enactment of the Judicial Committee (Repeal) Act 1994 (No. 2 of 1994) (Sing.). 
19  Chan Hiang Leng Colin v. Public Prosecutor, [1994] 3 S.L.R. 662 (High Ct.) (Sing.). 
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argument by the appellant that was based on the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution, Chief Justice Yong Pung How referred to the four walls doctrine: 
There is a fundamental difference between the right to freedom of religion 
under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution and art 15. The 
American provision consists of an “establishment clause” which proscribes 
any preference for a particular religion (Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion) and a “free exercise clause” which is 
based on the principle of governmental non-interference with religion 
(Congress shall make no law prohibiting the free exercise thereof). 
Significantly, the Singapore Constitution does not prohibit the 
“establishment” of any religion. The social conditions in Singapore are, of 
course, markedly different from those in the United States. On this basis alone, 
I am not influenced by the various views as enunciated in the American cases 
cited to me but instead must restrict my analysis of the issues here with 
reference to the local context.20 
Chan Hiang Leng Colin’s invocation of the doctrine was followed in the 
unreported decision by the High Court—Singapore’s superior court of unlimited 
original jurisdiction—of Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical 
Education,21 in which a teacher was dismissed for refusing on religious grounds to 
take the national pledge or sing the national anthem. One of the issues considered 
was the effect of the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion on his 
contractual obligations. Referring to Chan Hiang Leng Colin, Justice Tan Lee Meng 
affirmed the four walls doctrine, observing that there were “differences between the 
American position and the Singapore Constitution and that social conditions in 
Singapore are markedly different from those in the United States.”22 On appeal, the 
doctrine was once again cited with approval by the Court of Appeal.23 
Two features of the foregoing decisions warrant mention. First, there is a 
tendency for foreign case law to be dismissed as irrelevant under the four walls 
                                                   
20  [1994] 3 S.L.R. 681 (High Ct.) (Sing.). 
21  Peter Williams Nappalli v. Institute of Technical Education, [1998] SGHC 351, paras. 40–42 
(High Ct.) (Sing.). The four walls doctrine was also cited with approval in Taw Cheng Kong v. Public 
Prosecutor, [1998] 1 S.L.R. 943, para. 78 (High Ct.) (Sing.). 
22  Id. at para. 42. 
23  Nappalli Peter Williams v. Institute of Technical Education, [1999] 2 S.L.R. 569, para. 19 (C.A.) 
(Sing.). 
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doctrine on the basis of differences in wording between the foreign bill of rights and 
the domestic constitution. Second, this dismissal is often buttressed by a declaration 
that foreign law is inapplicable locally because conditions in the two jurisdictions 
differ. If, as has been suggested above,24 the four walls doctrine is essentially directed 
at preventing the constitutional text from being disregarded, the second feature is, 
arguably, an objection to foreign law that stands apart from the four walls doctrine. 
That point, therefore, will be considered below, in section 3, of this article. The 
balance of this section will examine the first feature. 
The four walls doctrine may be applied without much difficulty where the text 
speaks unambiguously. In Adegbenro v. Akintola,25 for example, the main issue to 
arise was whether the governor of the Western Region of Nigeria was entitled to 
dismiss the respondent from the premiership without a vote having been taken, 
solely on the basis of a letter signed by 66 of the 124 members of the House of 
Assembly stating that they no longer supported the premier. The governor 
purportedly had acted under section 33 of the Constitution of Western Nigeria, which 
reads: “(10) … the Ministers of the Government of the Region shall hold office during 
the Governor’s pleasure: Provided that—(a) the Governor shall not remove the 
Premier from office unless it appears to him that the Premier no longer commands 
the support of a majority of the members of the House of Assembly… .” One of the 
arguments advanced by the respondent was that the Nigerian provincial 
constitutions were modeled on the constitutional doctrines of the United Kingdom, 
and, since the British Sovereign would not be regarded as acting with constitutional 
propriety in dismissing a prime minister from office without an adverse vote in the 
House of Commons, so the governor in Western Nigeria must be similarly precluded 
                                                   
24  Supra notes 5–8 and accompanying text. 
25  Supra note 5. 
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from exercising his removal powers in the absence of a vote of the same kind. The 
Privy Council declined to accept this argument, finding, inter alia, nothing in the 
general scheme or in specific provisions of the Constitution that stated that the 
governor was precluded, legally, from forming his opinion on the basis of anything 
but votes formally given on the floor of the House. 
On the other hand, as bills of rights often embody broad statements of 
principle, it is arguably inaccurate to declare that foreign law can shed no light on 
their texts. For example, as we have seen, article 9(1) of the Singapore Constitution 
provides that “[n]o person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty save in 
accordance with law.” The due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments to the U.S. Constitution state that no person shall be deprived of “life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Regardless of the differences in 
wording, can it be said definitively that American cases involving the due process 
clauses are of no help at all in elucidating what constitutes an improper deprivation 
of life and personal liberty in the context of the Singapore Constitution? A court 
would have to satisfy itself that any foreign legal principles referred to were 
consonant with domestic constitutional doctrine, but a minor difference in the 
phrasing of domestic and foreign texts should not in itself disqualify foreign 
principles of law from consideration in the interpretation of domestic bills of rights. 
Victor Ramraj terms the four walls doctrine “legal rhetoric” and observes that 
it is routinely disregarded by the Singapore courts in practice.26 Using a vocabulary 
developed by Sunit Choudhry,27 Ramraj notes that the Singapore courts have used 
foreign case law in “genealogical interpretations” of the Constitution—that is, 
                                                   
26  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 309–310. 
27  Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of Comparative 
Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819 (1999). 
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interpretations based on the notion that relationships of genealogy and history, 
which tie certain constitutions together, offer sufficient justification for the 
importation and application of entire areas of constitutional doctrine.28 
In Singapore, for instance, it is common for courts to refer to Malaysian and 
Indian case law when interpreting the Constitution; the fundamental liberties in the 
Singapore Constitution were inherited from the Malaysian Constitution, which was 
inspired, in turn, by the Indian Constitution.29 As an example, it was held in Kok 
Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor30 that a legislative provision does not violate 
article 12(1) of the Singapore Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll persons are 
equal before the law and entitled to the equal protection of the law,” if it passes the 
“rational nexus” test. This test requires the classification employed by the provision 
to be founded on an intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons grouped 
together from others left out of the group, and the differentia must have a rational 
relation to the end to be achieved by the law in question. In other words, there must 
be a logical nexus between the basis of classification and the purpose of the law.31 The 
rational nexus test was adopted from the decision of the Malaysian Federal Court of 
Criminal Appeal in Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v. Public Prosecutor, 32  which 
followed the Indian Supreme Court case of Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice 
S R Tendolkar.33 It is to be noted that the wording of article 12(1) of the Singapore 
Constitution differs slightly from the negative phrasing of article 14(1) of the Indian 
                                                   
28  Choudhry, id. at 838. 
29  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 311–313. 
30  Kok Hoong Tan Dennis v. Public Prosecutor, [1997] 1 S.L.R. 123 (High Ct.) (Sing.). 
31  Id. at para. 34. 
32  Datuk Haji bin Harun Idris v. Public Prosecutor, [1977] 2 M.L.J. 155 (Fed. Ct.) (Mal.). 
33  Shri Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Shri Justice S.R. Tendolkar, A.I.R. 1958 S.C. 538, [1959] Sup. Ct. 
Rep. 279, 296–297 (Sup. Ct.) (India). 
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Constitution: “The State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the 
equal protection of the laws within the territory of India.” 
A genealogical interpretation appears to assume that if a local bill of rights 
was modeled on a foreign bill of rights, the legislature must have intended foreign 
legal doctrines to be applicable to the local context as well. However, unless there is 
evidence—such as reported legislative history—pointing to this conclusion, the 
assumption may not be justified. Rather, what a court should be asking itself is 
whether the concepts embodied in the text of a foreign bill of rights and the 
meanings that have been ascribed to that text are able to elucidate the content of 
corresponding provisions in the local bill of rights. 
Neither has the four walls doctrine deterred Singapore courts from 
considering, both favorably and unfavorably, cases from jurisdictions other than 
Malaysia and India. In Peter Williams Nappalli before the High Court,34 the judge, 
having referred to the doctrine with approval, went on to use foreign cases to buttress 
his argument, citing two U.S. cases, a Sri Lankan case, and an English case. On 
appeal, the Court of Appeal again invoked the four walls doctrine, and then 
proceeded to consider Australian, Philippine, American, English, and Canadian 
cases.35 Indeed, it appears that the four walls doctrine is sometimes used as a device 
for rejecting certain lines of foreign authority while accepting others. 
Ramraj characterizes this way of proceeding36 as analogous to what Choudhry 
calls a “dialogical interpretation” of a bill of rights.37 A court taking this interpretive 
approach engages in a kind of dialogue with comparative jurisprudence in order to 
                                                   
34  Supra note 21. 
35  Id. at 308–309. 
36  Id. at 313–317. 
37  Choudhry, supra note 27, at 836. 
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better understand its own constitutional system and jurisprudence. 38  The court 
examines comparative case law and doctrine, not so much to gain an accurate picture 
of the state of the law in the other jurisdiction as to identify the assumptions that 
underpin it. The comparative jurisprudence serves as an “interpretive foil”: in 
analyzing why foreign courts have reasoned a certain way, a court will surely ask 
itself why it reasons the way it does.39 
Having identified the assumptions underlying the foreign law and its own law, 
the court then faces a set of interpretive choices. If the court opts to reject foreign 
assumptions in favor of its own, the exercise is nonetheless bound to have heightened 
its awareness and understanding of constitutional difference, which, in turn, will 
shape and help guide the process of subsequent constitutional interpretation. 
Conversely, if constitutional similarities are identified and embraced, dialogical 
interpretation grounds the legitimacy of importing comparative jurisprudence and 
applying it as law.40 
As a further possibility, a court may reject ingrained assumptions both in the 
foreign law and the law of its own jurisdiction and stake out a new interpretive 
approach proceeding from radically different premises, or determine instances of 
presumed constitutional difference to be unfounded. Thus, the process of dialogical 
interpretation “can lead the court to fundamentally re-assess its previous judgments, 
and to use comparative jurisprudence as a means to initiate radical legal change.”41 
Foreign constitutional jurisprudence is often considered by Singapore courts 
dialogically, only to be ultimately rejected.42 On the other hand, older lines of foreign 
                                                   
38  Id. 
39  Choudhry, supra note 27, at 857. 
40  Id. at 858. 
41  Id. 
42  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 314. 
- 14 - 
authority, which would not now be referred to in their own jurisdictions, have been 
followed in preference to modern jurisprudence. In Jeyaretnam Joshua Benjamin v. 
Lee Kuan Yew,43 the Canadian case Tucker v. Douglas44 was cited with approval. 
This case, decided before the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms came into 
force on April 17, 1982, is unlikely to be considered persuasive in Canada today. 
Similarly, in Chan Hiang Leng Colin,45 the Singapore High Court, after invoking the 
four walls doctrine, referred with approval to Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses 
Inc v. Commonwealth,46 an Australian case decided during World War II.47 
Ramraj acknowledges that it might be argued that such selective use of foreign 
constitutional cases is objectionable because the local court is employing these cases 
in support of its own position by taking them out of their legal and historical context. 
However, he says this misses the point: the dialogical approach merely uses 
comparative case law “instrumentally, as a means to stimulate constitutional self-
reflection,”48 and does not purport to make normative claims based on the cases.49 
There is something to be said for judges using foreign material as a source of 
inspiration when considering how bill of rights jurisprudence should be developed; 
this is a point to which I return later.50 Further, a key advantage of a dialogical 
approach is that it does not require the court to acquire a deeper understanding of 
the workings of a borrowed foreign legal doctrine and the role that it plays in the 
legal system from which the doctrine is derived. 
                                                   
43  Supra note 15. 
44  Tucker v. Douglas, [1950] 2 D.L.R. 827 (C.A.) (Sask.). 
45  Supra note 19. 
46  Adelaide Co. of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v. Commonwealth, (1943) 67 C.L.R. 116 (High Ct.) 
(Aust.). 
47  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 315. 
48  Choudhry, supra note 27, at 892. 
49  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 315–316. 
50  See the discussion on cross-fertilization infra, at the text accompanying notes 107–108. 
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However, while in theory it is possible for a judge to refer to comparative 
material solely for instrumental purposes, in many cases it will be hard to imagine 
the judge does not have a preference for one line of authority over another. However, 
for a judge to act in this way would be undesirable, particularly if he neither 
articulates why obsolete legal principles are being applied nor provides convincing 
reasons why modern lines of authority have been rejected. A judgment that uses 
dialogical interpretation in this manner thus risks appearing arbitrary and illogical. 
In summary, the four walls doctrine does not mandate a wholesale rejection of 
comparative constitutional material, as we have seen in jurisdictions such as 
Singapore and Malaysia, which have repeatedly affirmed the doctrine but 
nonetheless drawn upon foreign law in genealogical and dialogical interpretations of 
their respective Constitutions. 
However, both genealogical and dialogical interpretations have their 
weaknesses. Genealogical interpretation is legitimate provided there exists sufficient 
evidence that when the legislature imported the words of a foreign bill of rights into a 
local statute it intended also to import the meanings given those words by foreign 
judicial interpretation. Otherwise, a more sensible approach is for the local court to 
assess whether comparative material, whether or not originating from an “ancestral” 
bill of rights, is capable of illuminating the meaning of the local text. Dialogical 
interpretation appears to be conceptually acceptable, but judgments that refer to 
foreign cases out of context may come across as irrational. 
The four walls doctrine should be understood, properly speaking, as a rule 
aimed at ensuring that a foreign legal principle is not applied when it cannot be 
validly accommodated by the text of a bill of rights. The doctrine, therefore, does not 
altogether exclude the use of comparative constitutional material. If this view is 
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accepted, the difficulties with the genealogical and dialogical interpretations 
discussed above do not undermine the point. 
2. Concern based on national identity 
Skepticism has also been directed against the use of comparative constitutional 
material on the ground of what Mark Tushnet calls “expressivism”—the idea that 
constitutions help constitute the nation, to varying degrees in different nations, 
offering to each nation’s people a way of understanding themselves as political 
beings.51 Because a constitution is seen as embodying the commitments that define a 
national identity, this is said to speak against constitutional borrowing.52 
This was one of the main points made by the U.S. attorney general in his 
address at the University of Chicago Law School. Gonzales noted that the U.S. 
Constitution was built upon the consent of the governed. When the Supreme Court 
held a law to be unconstitutional, it was vindicating the will of a sovereign people 
embodied in the written Constitution against the temporary expression of popular 
will manifested in the particular actions of a legislature. Therefore, he questioned 
how the standards of anyone other than the people of the U.S. could legitimately be 
relevant to determining the will of the American people.53 
The position is also exemplified in the views of Justice Antonin Scalia in 
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions handed down in the past two decades. In 
Scalia’s dissent in Thompson v. Oklahoma,54 as well as in a judgment on behalf of the 
                                                   
51  Mark Tushnet, The Possibilities of Comparative Constitutional Law, 108 YALE L.J. 1225–
1228 (1999). 
52  Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640, 648–649 (1999). 
53  Gonzales, supra note 2, at 19. 
54  Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 108 S. Ct. 2687 (1988). 
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majority in Stanford v. Kentucky55—both cases deal with the constitutionality of 
executing felons who were young adolescents at the time the crimes were 
committed56—he objected emphatically to even the most formulaic references to legal 
rules in other Western democracies.57 
The majority in Thompson held that executing a person younger than sixteen 
years of age at the time of the commission of the capital offense ran counter to 
civilized standards of decency. It observed that this was consistent with the views of 
“other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by leading members of 
the Western European community.” 58  The same position was taken in Justice 
William Brennan’s dissenting judgment in Stanford.59 Justice Scalia disagreed with 
this approach in footnotes to his judgments in the two cases,60 calling it 
totally inappropriate as a means of establishing the fundamental beliefs of this 
Nation... . We must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United States 
of America that we are expounding. The practices of other nations, 
particularly democracies, can be relevant to determining whether a practice 
uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident, but rather so 
“implicit in the context of ordered liberty” that it occupies a place not merely 
in our mores but, text permitting, in our Constitution as well. But where there 
is not first a settled consensus among our own people, the views of other 
nations, however enlightened the Justices of this Court may think them to be, 
cannot be imposed upon Americans through the Constitution.61 
                                                   
55  Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 109 S. Ct. 2969 (1989). 
56  In Thompson v. Oklahoma, supra note 54, the Supreme Court held that statutes that 
permitted the imposition of capital punishment on a person under the age of sixteen at the time when 
the offense was committed violated the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution. 
Stanford v. Kentucky, supra note 55, decided that such punishment was permissible if a person was 
over the age of fifteen but under eighteen at the relevant time. The latter decision was abrogated in 
Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005): infra note 67 and the accompanying text. 
57  Lorraine E. Weinrib, Constitutional Conceptions and Constitutional Comparativism, in 
DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (Vicki C. Jackson & Mark Tushnet eds., 
Praeger 2002), ch. 1, 3 at 5. 
58  Thompson, supra note 54, 487 U.S. at 830–831, pointing out that the United Kingdom, New 
Zealand, and the Soviet Union did not permit the execution of juveniles; that the death penalty had 
been abolished entirely in Australia (except for New South Wales), West Germany, France, Portugal, 
the Netherlands, and all Scandinavian countries; and that it was available only for exceptional crimes 
such as treason in Canada, Italy, Spain, Switzerland, and in New South Wales in Australia. 
59  Stanford, supra note 55, 492 U.S. at 389. Justice Brennan’s dissent was joined by Marshall, 
Blackmun, and Stevens. 
60  Thompson, supra note 54, 487 U.S. at 868 n. 4; Stanford, supra note 55, 492 U.S. at 369 n. 1. 
61  Thompson and Stanford, id. 
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Justice Scalia’s opinions in this regard emerge elsewhere. The 1997 case of 
Printz v. United States62 involved the federal Brady Handgun Violence Prevention 
Act,63 the provisions of which directed the attorney general to establish a national 
system for instantly checking the backgrounds of prospective handgun purchasers; 
the law also required the chief law enforcement officer of each local jurisdiction to 
perform such checks and related tasks on an interim basis until the national system 
became operative. The petitioners, who were the chief law enforcement officers for 
counties in Montana and Arizona, challenged the constitutionality of the interim 
provisions on the ground that congressional action could not compel state officers to 
execute federal laws. This argument was accepted by a plurality of the Supreme Court. 
In a dissenting opinion, Justice Stephen Breyer found support for his 
opposing view in the fact that the United States was not the only nation that sought 
to reconcile the practical need for a central authority with the democratic virtues of 
more local control. He noted that the federal systems of Switzerland, Germany, and 
the European Union all provided that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, 
would implement many of the laws, rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the 
central federal body.64 He remarked: 
Of course, we are interpreting our own Constitution, not those of other 
nations, and there may be relevant political and structural differences 
between their systems and our own... . But their experience may nonetheless 
cast an empirical light on the consequences of different solutions to a 
common legal problem. ...65 
Justice Scalia, writing the plurality opinion, responded that “such comparative 
analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of interpreting a constitution, though it was of 
                                                   
62  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 117 S. Ct. 2365 (1997). 
63  Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, 18 USC § 921 et. seq., (named for presidential press 
secretary James Brady, who was shot with an illegal handgun during an attempted assassination of 
President Ronald Reagan in 1981). 
64  Printz, id. at 521 U.S. at 976 (Stevens J. joining). 
65  Id. at 977. 
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course quite relevant to the task of writing one... . The fact is that our federalism is 
not Europe’s. It is ‘the unique contribution of the Framers to political science and 
political theory.’ ”66 
The Supreme Court returned to the constitutionality of imposing capital 
punishment on juveniles in Roper v. Simmons.67 Sixteen years earlier, Stanford v. 
Kentucky68 had held that such punishment was permissible if a person was over the 
age of fifteen but under eighteen at the time of the offense. This time, a majority of 
the Court found that, because standards of decency had evolved since Stanford, the 
Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution now forbade the imposition 
of the death penalty on offenders under the age of eighteen at the time of commission. 
While the majority saw the disproportionateness of the death penalty for juvenile 
offenders confirmed by the fact that the United States was the only country in the 
world that continued to give official sanction to the practice, this stark fact did not 
suggest a definitive interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition of “cruel 
and unusual punishments.” However, on previous occasions the Court had referred 
to the laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive in this 
regard. The United Kingdom’s experience was held to be particularly relevant in light 
of the historic ties between the two countries and the Eighth Amendment’s origins in 
the English Declaration of Rights of 1689, which provided: “[E]xcessive Bail ought 
not to be required nor excessive Fines imposed; nor cruel and unusual Punishments 
inflicted.” 69  The majority concluded: “It does not lessen our fidelity to the 
Constitution or our pride in its origins to acknowledge that the express affirmation of 
                                                   
66  Id. at 921 note 11, citing U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 at 575, 115 S. Ct. 1624 at 1638 (1995). 
67  Roper v. Simmons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). 
68  Supra note 55. 
69  1 W. & M., c. 2, s. 10: Roper, supra note 67 at 1198–1199. 
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certain fundamental rights by other nations and peoples simply underscores the 
centrality of those same rights within our own heritage of freedom.”70 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor echoed these sentiments in her dissenting 
opinion: 
[T]his Nation’s evolving understanding of human dignity certainly is neither 
wholly isolated from, nor inherently at odds with, the values prevailing in 
other countries. On the contrary, we should not be surprised to find 
congruence between domestic and international values, especially where the 
international community has reached clear agreement—expressed in 
international law or in the domestic laws of individual countries—that a 
particular form of punishment is inconsistent with fundamental human rights. 
At least, the existence of an international consensus of this nature can serve to 
confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American 
consensus.71 
Not surprisingly, Justice Scalia took exception to the reference to foreign and 
international legal materials. In his opinion, the majority’s basic premise as he 
characterized it—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world—ought to be rejected out of hand. He noted that, in many significant respects, 
the laws of most other countries differed from American law. This included not only 
explicit provisions of the Constitution but even many interpretations of the 
Constitution prescribed by the Supreme Court itself. 72  The Court either had to 
profess its willingness to reconsider all these matters in light of the views of 
foreigners or to cease putting forth foreigners’ views as part of the reasoned basis of 
                                                   
70  Roper, id. at 1200. 
71  Roper, supra note 67 at 1215–1216. However, as she did not believe that a genuine national 
consensus against the juvenile death penalty had yet developed, and because she did not believe that 
the majority’s moral proportionality argument justified a categorical, age-based constitutional rule, 
she was of the view that the international consensus described by the majority could not be regarded 
as confirmation of the Court’s decision: id. at 1215. 
72  Id. at 1226. Scalia J. found the majority’s particular reliance on the laws of the United 
Kingdom “perhaps the most indefensible part of its opinion.” Taking a characteristically originalist 
viewpoint, he said it was true that the United States shared a common history with the United 
Kingdom, and that the Court often consulted English sources when asked to discern the meaning of a 
constitutional text written against the backdrop of eighteenth-century English law and legal thought. 
If the majority had applied that approach, it would have found that the “cruel and unusual 
punishments” provision of the English Declaration of Rights was originally meant to describe those 
punishments that were not authorized by common law or statute, but that were nonetheless 
administered by the Crown or the Crown’s judges. Under that reasoning, the death penalty for under-
18 offenders would have easily survived the present challenge: id. at 1227. 
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its decisions. “To invoke alien law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore 
it otherwise, is not reasoned decision-making, but sophistry.” 73  In his view the 
majority had relied on foreign sources, not to underscore the Court’s “fidelity” to the 
Constitution, its “pride in its origins,” and its “own [American] heritage,”74 but to set 
aside the centuries-old American practice—one still engaged in by a large majority of 
the states—of letting a jury decide whether, in the particular case, youth should be 
the basis for withholding the death penalty.75 
It needs to be appreciated that, in determining whether a particular form of 
punishment is “cruel and unusual” under the Eighth Amendment, the Supreme 
Court has stated that it must consider whether there is a national consensus that laws 
allowing such punishment contravene modern standards of decency in the country.76 
This may explain to some extent why Scalia vehemently opposed references to 
foreign and international law in the juvenile death penalty cases: he believed that 
foreign law could have no bearing on the beliefs and practices of the United States.77 
But this does not explain his parochialism and opposition to comparative material in 
Printz, which was not an Eighth Amendment case. 
                                                   
73  Id. at 1227. See also id. at 1229: “... I do not believe that approval by ‘other nations and 
peoples’ should buttress our commitment to American principles any more than (what should 
logically follow) disapproval by ‘other nations and peoples’ should weaken that commitment.” 
Eclecticism toward foreign law may not objectionable if one appreciates the distinction between legal 
transplants and cross-fertilization; this point is discussed in section 3, infra. 
74  Supra note 70. 
75  Roper, supra note 67 at 1229. 
76  Id. at 1217–1218 per Scalia J. (dissenting), citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 at 101, 78 S. Ct. 
590 (1958). 
77  Vicki Jackson, however, notes that foreign and international law have been referred to in 
interpreting the Eighth Amendment since the nineteenth century: Vicki Jackson, Constitutional 
Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance, Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109, 109 (2005), citing 
Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 134 (1879) (sentence of death by shooting in the Utah Territory 
constitutional, partly because “[c]orresponding rules [that] prevail in other countries” supported the 
practice); see also the cases cited, supra note 8. 
- 22 - 
Tushnet 78  is of the view that expressivism and the use of comparative 
constitutional material are not inconsistent, because judges of wide learning—
whether in comparative constitutional law, in the classics of literature, in economics, 
or in many other fields—may see things about their own society that judges with a 
narrower vision miss. Having seen their society from this broader perspective, these 
judges might then use standard methods of constitutional interpretation, such as 
reliance on text, structure, history, or democratic theory, to reach results that their 
colleagues might not have reached. Hence, comparative constitutional law operates 
in the way that a general liberal education does. If judges are entitled to rely on what 
they take from great works of literature as they interpret the Constitution, they 
should be entitled to rely on comparative constitutional law as well.79 
More importantly, expressivism does not preclude the existence of 
constitutional norms that transcend national boundaries. In fact, it is apt to see 
domestic bills of rights as embodying universally shared norms. Lorraine Weinrib 
finds a nation-centric approach to constitutional interpretation to be incorrect. She 
sees in the rights-protecting instruments adopted in the aftermath of World War II a 
shared constitutional conception that, by design, transcends the history, cultural 
heritage, and social mores of any particular nation-state. The shared conceptual 
foundation of these instruments is to secure democratic government, the rule of law, 
and protection for equal human dignity. They require all states to treat everyone over 
                                                   
78  Tushnet, supra note 51. 
79  Tushnet, id. at 1236–1237. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 116–117 (if more than one 
interpretation of the Constitution is plausible from domestic legal sources, approaches taken in other 
countries may provide helpful empirical information in deciding what interpretation will work best; 
further, comparisons can shed light on the distinctive functioning of the domestic legal system); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, A Decent Respect of the Opinions of [Human]kind: The Value of a Comparative 
Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, 64 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 575, 580, 584 (2005) (foreign opinions 
not authoritative, but “add to the store of knowledge relevant to the solution of trying questions,” and 
since judges are free to consult other forms of legal commentary such as restatements of law, treatises, 
and law reviews, there should be no objection to them considering the analysis of a question contained 
in a foreign case as well). 
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whom they hold power as ends, not means, and to respect both their full and equal 
humanity and desire for self-fulfillment.80 She argues that a constitution, therefore, 
should not be interpreted with the stress laid on national consensus but, rather, in 
light of the shared conceptual foundation. Naturally, this approach embraces the use 
of comparative material. 
Weinrib’s view fits in with Choudhry’s “universalist interpretation” of a 
constitution, although the latter does not identify any specific shared conceptual 
foundations. However, as Ramraj explains, a universalist interpretation involves an 
assumption that there exist constitutional norms that transcend jurisdictions; thus, 
the interpretation and articulation of these norms by one particular constitutional 
court can be drawn on by any other constitutional court.81 It is very difficult to argue 
that there is no intersection of constitutional values across jurisdictions at all, and a 
minimal intersection is enough to justify the claim that a universalist approach to 
comparative constitutional jurisprudence is at least sometimes warranted. Once it is 
acknowledged that there are minimally some constitutional norms that transcend 
jurisdictions, this justifies a court in looking to foreign constitutional cases for 
assistance in understanding them. 82  In addition, if the potential existence of 
transcendent constitutional norms is accepted, a court is justified in looking to 
comparative material to search for them, whether or not such norms are ultimately 
uncovered.83 
                                                   
80  Weinrib, supra note 57, at 15. See also Jackson, supra note 77, at 118 (individual rights 
embedded in national constitutions have ‘universal’ aspects, and foreign or international legal sources 
may illuminate these suprapositive dimensions of constitutional rights, as when constitutional text or 
doctrine requires contemporary judgments about a quality of action or freedom, such as the 
‘reasonableness’ of a search or the ‘cruelty’ of a punishment). 
81  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 304. 
82  Id. at 325–326. 
83  Id. at 329. 
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A recent decision of the Singapore Court of Appeal provides an example of 
how a court may find that a transcendent norm is protected by a national bill of 
rights. In Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor 84  the appellant had been 
convicted at first instance, under the Misuse of Drugs Act,85 of importing 396.2 
grams of diamorphine into Singapore without authorization. The quantity of 
controlled drugs involved in the case was sufficient to trigger the mandatory penalty 
of death by hanging. The appellant challenged this on the basis that it would be 
contrary to the prohibition in customary international law against cruel and inhuman 
treatment or punishment, which was part of the “in accordance with law” 
requirement in article 9(1).86 The Court agreed that it was widely accepted that the 
prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment or punishment does amount to a 
rule in customary international law but found that the appellant had not shown a 
specific prohibition in customary international law against hanging as a mode of 
execution. Nor was there enough evidence to show a customary international law 
prohibition against the death penalty generally.87 
Regardless of what one thinks of the outcome of Nguyen Tuong Van, by 
recognizing the existence of the prohibition against cruel and inhuman treatment or 
punishment in customary international law, the Court of Appeal acknowledged that 
the bill of rights in the Singapore Constitution reflects transcendent constitutional 
norms. This approach opens the door to the recognition, in appropriate cases,88 of 
                                                   
84  Nguyen Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, [2005] 1 S.L.R. 103 (C.A.) (Sing.). 
85  Cap. 185, (2001) Rev. Ed. (Sing.). 
86  Nguyen Tuong Van, supra note 84, at para. 89. Art. 9(1) is set out in the text accompanying 
notes 10–11. 
87  Id. at paras. 91–92. In addition, it held that even if there were a customary international law 
rule prohibiting execution by hanging, the domestic statute providing for such punishment, that is, the 
Misuse of Drugs Act, prevailed in the event of inconsistency: id. at para. 94. 
88  Note, however, the view taken that if the word law in the Constitution includes international 
law, it is only where the executive and the courts “agree” that a specific customary rule (which 
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other transcendent norms in which the Court may be prepared to consider foreign 
materials that reveal how such norms are construed by other jurisdictions. 
Although expressivism and universalism are not mutually inconsistent, they 
appear to pull in opposite directions. However, a balance may be struck between 
them, as is well illustrated by South African constitutional law. In 1994, the interim 
constitution89 of postapartheid South Africa came into force. Section 35(1) of chapter 
3 of that constitution stated: “In interpreting the provisions of this Chapter a court of 
law shall promote the values which underlie an open and democratic society based 
on freedom and equality and shall, where applicable, have regard to public 
international law applicable to the protection of the rights entrenched in this Chapter, 
and may have regard to comparable foreign case law.”90 
The terms of section 39 of chapter 2 of the current South African 
Constitution,91 which took effect92 in 1997 following extensive discussions and public 
consultations by the Constitutional Assembly, are quite similar to section 35(1) of the 
interim constitution. Section 39 reads: 
When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum— 
(a) must promote the values that underlie an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom; 
(b) must consider international law; and 
(c) may consider foreign law.93 
                                                                                                                                                              
conflicts with parliamentary legislation) applies that such a customary rule may be said to have been 
incorporated into the Constitution, unless a nonderogable rule of customary international law (that is, 
jus cogens) is involved where, as a matter of law, it would be unimaginable that Singapore would 
object to it: C.L. Lim, The Constitution and the Reception of Customary International Law: Nguyen 
Tuong Van v. Public Prosecutor, [2005] SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 218, 227–233. 
89  S. AFR. (Interim) CONST. 1993. 
90  Hoyt Webb, The Constitutional Court of South Africa: Rights Interpretation and 
Comparative Constitutional Law, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 205, 206–207 (1998). 
91  S. AFR. CONST. 1996. 
92  Except for one provision relating to the election of chairpersons to municipal councils: 
Proclamation No R 6, 1997. 
93  Webb, supra note 90, at 206–207. 
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Hoyt Webb has theorized that South African courts, tribunals, and forums, 
which includes the Constitutional Court, were specifically enjoined to consider 
international law and permitted to consider foreign law, when interpreting the 
Constitution’s bill of rights, because 
reference to external jurisprudence from “open and democratic” societies 
offered an appropriate method for assuring the public that the “Fundamental 
Rights” described in the [interim and final] Constitutions would be reasonably 
protected from future interpretational mischief or bigotry. 
... 
Given the uniquely terrible history of apartheid under which South Africa’s 
legal and administrative systems were established to enforce and maintain the 
segregation, marginalization and minimization of the majority of South 
Africans of color, the framers of the IC [interim Constitution] wisely ensured 
that the standards applied to the construction of the post-apartheid legal 
system were not drawn from the same well, but from purer waters.94 
The operation of section 35(1) of the interim Constitution is exemplified by the 
decision of the Constitutional Court in State v. Makwanyane,95 which abolished the 
death penalty in South Africa. At several points in the lengthy decision, international 
and foreign comparative jurisprudence was examined. Nonetheless, the Court was 
careful to underline the fact that foreign legal principles should not be applied 
blindly. As Chief Justice Arthur Chaskalson, who delivered the leading judgment, put 
it: “Although we are told by section 35(1) that we ‘may’ have regard to foreign case 
law, it is important to appreciate that this will not necessarily offer a safe guide to the 
interpretation of Chapter 3 of our Constitution.”96 
For instance, in assessing whether the death penalty violated section 11(2) of 
the interim constitution, which provided that “[n]o person shall be subject to torture 
of any kind, whether physical, mental or emotional, nor shall any person be subject 
to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment,” Justice Chaskalson 
                                                   
94  Id. at 208 and 219. 
95 State v. Makwanyane 1995 (3) S.A. 391 (C.C.) (S. Afr.). 
96 Id. at 414. 
- 27 - 
considered cases on the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution prohibiting the imposition of cruel and unusual punishments. He noted 
that because this Constitution contemplates the existence of capital punishment,97 
the U.S. Supreme Court had taken the position that capital punishment was not 
unconstitutional per se but could be arbitrary, and thus unconstitutional, in certain 
circumstances. Difficulties with this approach experienced in the United States 
persuaded him that South Africa should not follow the same route.98 Further, the 
different language used in the interim constitution and the U.S. Constitution meant 
that each text merited a different analysis. 99  Nonetheless, elements of the U.S. 
Court’s analysis of the issues, especially as it related to the impropriety of 
arbitrariness and inequality in the imposition of the punishment, were germane to 
the analysis of relevant provisions of the interim constitution. 100  In the end, 
Chaskalson was satisfied that in the context of the interim constitution, the death 
penalty was cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and thus violated section 
11(2).101 
In Makwanyane, therefore, one of the main issues faced by the South African 
Court was to arrive at a determination of what constitutes cruel, inhuman, and 
degrading punishment. The substance of this judgment may be regarded as a 
transcendent constitutional norm that the Court elucidated by examining 
comparative legal material. Aware that its decision had to be consonant with the 
                                                   
97  The Fifth Amendment states that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury ...” and “nor shall 
any person ... be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.” 
98  Makwanyane, supra note 95, at 422. 
99  Unlike the South African interim constitution, the United States Constitution does not have a 
limitations clause, thus forcing courts to find limits to constitutional rights through a narrow 
interpretation of the rights themselves: Makwanyane, id. at 435. On the limitations clause in the South 
African interim constitution, see infra notes 111–115 and the accompanying text. 
100  Id. at 417–421. See Webb, supra note 90, at 238–240. 
101  Makwanyane, id. at 433–434. 
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terms of the Constitution, it did not apply foreign or international legal principles 
unthinkingly but used them to inform the constitutional law of South Africa and, 
eventually, to develop its own legal principles. In this way, the Court demonstrated 
how expressivism and universalism may be successfully balanced. 
To recapitulate, accepting an expressivist view of a constitution or a bill of 
rights does not require a judge to refrain from referring to comparative material, for 
such material may, in fact, assist him in better understanding the national identity of 
his country. More significantly, a domestic bill of rights is appropriately viewed as 
encapsulating transcendent constitutional norms. That being the case, it should be 
permissible both to use comparative material to identify such norms and to 
comprehend them. Of course, in referring to comparative material, judges must be 
careful to ensure that such comparison is consistent with the text of the domestic bill 
of rights. 
3. Concern for differing conditions 
We have seen that Singapore courts have, on a number of occasions, declined to 
consider comparative legal material on the basis, ostensibly, that social or other 
conditions in Singapore and the foreign country differ. Unfortunately, there is often 
no explanation in the holdings as to just how the conditions are different or why such 
differences are relevant. As Li-ann Thio has pointed out: “This perfunctory [waving] 
away of foreign cases on the basis of ‘we’re different’ is undesirable. A focused 
elaboration of the different social conditions of these countries would aid in assessing 
their relevance to the matter at hand.”102 
                                                   
102  Li-ann Thio, An ‘i’ for an ‘I’? Singapore’s Communitarian Model of Constitutional 
Adjudication, (1997) 27 HONG KONG. L.J. 152, 176, quoted in Ramraj, supra note 7, at 331. 
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Nonetheless, the underlying concern is valid. A key reason for referring to 
comparative material is a perception that there may be a constitutional doctrine or 
mode of analysis originating in a foreign jurisdiction that is suitable for domestic 
application. However, the comparative material may not be appropriate if conditions 
between the domestic and foreign jurisdictions differ to such an extent that the 
foreign doctrine might operate unpredictably or detrimentally. Seth Kreimer 
cautions that there may be a “problem of translation”: borrowing a foreign concept 
“yields no guarantee, or even likelihood, that the concept will mean the same thing to 
our courts that it does to its originators, or that the results reached in the [foreign] 
context will mirror the results the doctrine yields in its home arena, even if we were 
certain that those results were to be emulated.”103 It is also risky to predict the 
functioning of a legal doctrine in a new legal environment based on the way it 
functioned in the old one.104 
Admittedly, it is difficult to anticipate how a foreign legal doctrine will fare 
when applied in the domestic context. However, our concern over differing 
conditions may be assuaged by considering a distinction drawn by John Bell between 
legal transplants and cross-fertilization.105 Transplants entail the transposition of a 
doctrine from one legal system to another. 106  There are doubts about the 
effectiveness of this process, about whether a foreign doctrine grafted on to a 
                                                   
103  Seth F. Kreimer, Invidious Comparisons: Some Cautionary Remarks on the Process of 
Constitutional Borrowing, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 640 at 646–647 (1999). 
104  Id. at 642. 
105  John Bell, Mechanisms for Cross-Fertilisation of Administrative Law in Europe, in NEW 
DIRECTIONS IN EUROPEAN PUBLIC LAW (Jack Beatson & Takis Tridimas eds., Hart 1998), ch. 11, 147. 
106  Id. at 147–148. 
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domestic legal system will “take” if it is incompatible with domestic circumstances.107 
On the other hand, 
[c]ross-fertilisation implies a different, more indirect process. It implies that 
an external stimulus promotes an evolution within the receiving legal system. 
The evolution involves an internal adaptation by the receiving legal system in 
its own way. The new development is a distinctive but organic product of that 
system rather than a bolt-on.108 
Alan Watson points out that if what is sought in a foreign system is an idea 
that can be transformed into part of the law of one’s own country then a systematic 
knowledge of the law or political structure of a donor system is not necessary.109 In 
the same vein, the significance of differing conditions, social and otherwise, between 
the foreign and domestic jurisdictions may be downplayed. Thus, concerns regarding 
the operation of foreign legal doctrines in the domestic context may be addressed so 
long as such doctrines are not seen as potential material for wholesale 
transplantation but, rather, as inspiration for indigenous development in the 
domestic law. 
In deciding Makwanyane, 110  the South African Constitutional Court gave 
consideration to whether the limitations clause in section 33 of the interim 
constitution111 would uphold the validity of the death penalty, which had been found 
                                                   
107  See, e.g., Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q.R. 79, 81 (1976): 
“Without hesitation one can accept the proposition that a foreign legal rule will not easily be borrowed 
successfully if it does not fit into the domestic political context. The word ‘political’ is used . . . with a 
rather wide meaning, with reference not only to the structure of government and governmental 
institutions but also to powerful organised groups. . . .” 
108  Bell, supra note 105, at 147–148. 
109  Watson, supra note 107, at 79. 
110  Makwanyane, supra note 95. 
111  Section 33(1) states: “The rights entrenched in this Chapter may be limited by law of general 
application, provided that such limitation— 
a. shall be permissible only to the extent that it is—  
i. reasonable; and  
ii.  justifiable in an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality; and 
b. shall not negate the essential content of the right in question, and provided further that 
any limitation to—  
i. a right entrenched in section 10, 11, 12, 14 (1), 21, 25 or 30 (1) (d) or (e) or (2); or 
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to be cruel, inhuman, and degrading punishment and thus unconstitutional. 
Examining the interpretive techniques of the Supreme Court of Canada, the German 
Federal Constitutional Court, and the European Court of Human Rights, the Court 
found that limitations analysis typically consists of some form of a balancing test by 
which the courts review the means and ends of the offending legislation.112 However, 
due to textual differences between the interim constitution, on the one hand, and the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the Basic Law of the Federal Republic 
of Germany, on the other, the Court decided against directly adopting the tests used 
in those jurisdictions.113 
As for the proportionality test used by the European Court of Human Rights, 
Chaskalson found it an unsuitable guide to the interpretation of section 33 because 
the South African Court is not under the same constraints as the European Court. 
The latter is obliged to accommodate the sovereignty of its member states through 
the “margin of appreciation” doctrine, by which national authorities are allowed 
more discretion to contravene rights in areas concerning morals and social policy but 
less where a law seeks to limit a right fundamental to democratic society or interferes 
with intimate aspects of private life.114 The chief justice proceeded to articulate a new 
test that involved the weighing up of competing values and, ultimately, an 
assessment based on proportionality that examined the reasonableness and necessity 
for the limitation of constitutional rights.115 
                                                                                                                                                              
ii. a right entrenched in section 15, 16, 17, 18, 23 or 24, in so far as such right relates to 
free and fair political activity, shall, in addition to being reasonable as required in 
paragraph (a) (i), also be necessary.” 
112  Makwanyane, supra note 95, at 436–439. 
113  Id. at 438–439. 
114  Id. 
115  Id. at 436. See Webb, supra note 90, at 241–243. 
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Aside from the use of comparative material in legal cross-fertilization, there is 
a further point that follows from our consideration of transcendent constitutional 
norms. Ramraj argues that the existence of local, empirical conditions (social, 
economic, or historical) affecting the application of a general norm does not in itself 
present a challenge to comparative constitutional methodology or the universalist 
approach to foreign constitutional cases, if one accepts that at least some 
constitutional norms are transcendent.116 In his view, whatever the peculiarities of 
the local conditions, the courts are nonetheless free and, he would argue, duty-bound 
to look elsewhere for transcendent constitutional principles to apply in a particular 
case. In doing so, they might well realize that not all local conditions are as special as 
they may seem initially.117 
In other words, the existence of differing social and other conditions in the 
domestic and foreign jurisdictions does not impair the use of comparative material in 
discerning transcendent constitutional norms. Once a norm is identified, if local 
empirical conditions are so peculiar as to warrant a departure from the common 
normative standard, then a duty lies on the court to show clearly what these 
conditions are and why they justify the departure.118 Alternatively, it is justifiable to 
refer to comparative material eclectically in legal cross-fertilization, using it as a 
catalyst for an evolution of legal principles within the domestic legal system. 
4. Practical concerns 
In addition to the concern with principle, the consideration of foreign law in the 
interpretation of bills of rights can raise practical questions. These were invoked by 
                                                   
116  Ramraj, supra note 7, at 329–331. 
117  Id. at 331–332. 
118  Id. at 331. 
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the U.S. attorney general when he commented in his November 2005 speech that the 
use of comparative legal materials presents “a problem of selection and at least the 
appearance of capriciousness.”119 In his view, if it is accepted that foreign law can 
properly be used in construing the Constitution, at a minimum it should be done in a 
way that comprehensively examines all relevant international sources. However, it 
may be impossible for even the most conscientious judge or lawyer to avoid being 
selective or arbitrary in the use of foreign law.120 Further, even assuming that the 
necessary sources of foreign law can be gathered and translated, it would be an even 
greater task to understand and evaluate them fully.121 
Jeremy Waldron would disagree with Gonzales and, by virtue of his theory for 
the citation of foreign law in the interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, push the 
boundaries a little further. In his opinion, judges may refer to the ius gentium—the 
law of nations in a broad sense—which he defines as a set of legal principles that has 
established itself as a sort of consensus among judges, jurists, and lawmakers around 
the world,122 or, as he puts it, “a body of law purporting to represent what various 
domestic legal systems share in the way of common answers to common 
problems.”123 He draws an analogy with the world of medical science. If a new 
disease or epidemic appeared within the U.S., it would be ridiculous to say that to 
address the problem one should turn only to American science. On the contrary, U.S. 
scientists would want to look abroad, as well as inward, to see what scientific 
                                                   
119  Gonzales, supra note 2, at 10. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. at 11–12. See also Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. 
L. REV. 148, 165–166 (2005) (decision costs (time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a 
particular way) and error costs (likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a particular method) seem 
likely to be high for American courts dealing with foreign materials, given language and cultural 
barriers and most American lawyers’ lack of training in comparative analysis). 
122  Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L. Rev. 129, 132 
(2005). 
123  Id. at 133. 
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conclusions and strategies had emerged, been tested, and mutually validated in the 
public health practices of other countries. Similarly, a constitutional law problem 
such as that posed by Roper v. Simmons124 should be treated as one where the 
experiences of other legal systems in grappling with, untangling, and resolving rival 
rights and claims are relevant.125 
Waldron stresses that under his theory, the appeal to foreign law is not a 
piecemeal practice, which he regards as open to discrediting. 126  Rather, the ius 
gentium represents a consensus similar to that in science, which is not merely an 
accumulation of authorities but a “dense network of checking and rechecking results, 
experimental duplication, credentialing, mutual elaboration, and building on one 
another’s work.”127 Just as scientists are expected to consider findings they have 
reason to trust and not look to the work of suspect or disreputable laboratories, a ius 
gentium inquiry may similarly restrict itself to a consensus among “civilized” or 
“freedom-loving” countries.128 
Gonzales overstates the problem. The realities of legal and judicial practice 
make a selective approach to foreign legal materials inevitable; however, this does 
not render the process entirely arbitrary. There is nothing wrong with lawyers and 
judges using skills and discernment honed by experience to choose the foreign laws 
most likely to prove useful in the interpretive enterprise. Factors guiding the 
selection process might include the extent to which a foreign legal system and the 
domestic system share similar values, such as a respect for democracy, a concern for 
                                                   
124  Supra note 67. 
125  Waldron, supra note 122 at 144. 
126  Id. 
127  Id. at 145. 
128  Id. 
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the rule of law, and the protection of individual liberties;129 the degree of similarity 
between the issues faced by the two systems; and whether sufficient foreign legal 
materials are available in a language that the judge and the parties are able to work 
with. It is only to be expected that the foreign jurisdictions most likely to be chosen 
are those whose courts have had more experience in dealing with complex 
constitutional issues, rather than distant lands whose laws are not well known. 
Waldron’s ius gentium theory limits the foreign laws that judges may consider 
to those that reflect a harmony of opinion among like-minded nations. Where such 
consensus can be found courts would do well to take it into account. However, the 
discretion of judges should not be unduly restricted in this manner. As explained in 
section 3, there is value in a cross-fertilization of ideas, in judges gaining insights 
from other nations’ laws, and in using them to stimulate homegrown development in 
their own legal systems. To elaborate on Waldron’s public health analogy, scientists 
should not close their eyes to advances in other countries that have yet to be taken up 
in their own. As part of the scientific vanguard, they may play a significant role in 
creating a new consensus. 
According judges a broad discretion to consider foreign laws may open them 
to the charge that the interpretive enterprise becomes, as Young puts it, “profoundly 
manipulable.”130 The charge seems to stem from the assumption that the range of 
comparative legal materials is so vast that, if judges hunt around diligently enough, 
they will be able to find support for any personal predilection. However, this 
                                                   
129  See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 77, at 125–126 (“[P]ractices of countries with commitments to 
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law roughly comparable to ours [the U.S.] are likely to have 
more positive persuasive value as to the empirical consequences of doctrinal rules, the legitimate 
justifications for government action, or the implications of basic constitutional commitments”). 
130  Young, supra note 121, at 167. See also Gonzales, supra note 2, at 12: “[I]t cannot be expected 
that the laws of all sovereign nations—or, perhaps, even all the courts of a single nation—will agree on 
a disputed point of constitutional law. The decisionmaker will then be left somehow to choose among 
them. And this, of course, may lead to ... judicial activism or unrestrained judicial discretion. ...” 
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presumes that there exists a precedent for every point of view under the sun—which, 
arguably, has not been proved. Besides, the onus would be on the judge to give 
sufficient reasons for justifying the reliance on a particular authority and why it 
should be accorded more weight than other local and foreign authorities that take a 
different point of view. 
The difficulties of understanding comparative legal materials should not be 
exaggerated. As Young admits, the law engages virtually the full range of human 
activity; this means that courts must inevitably dabble in a wide range of disciplines 
in which they may lack specific training or expertise, including science and 
engineering in patent cases, and psychology in criminal cases. As in those instances, 
judges must simply be careful, articulate, and thorough when they cite foreign law.131 
5. The value of a comparative approach 
This article has examined four concerns that have been raised to challenge the use of 
comparative material to interpret bills of rights. The first, reflected in the four walls 
doctrine, makes little sense if all it asserts is that foreign material is irrelevant 
because it is not based on the local bill of rights. Many courts, including those of 
Singapore and Malaysia, reject this flawed reasoning. These courts often refer to 
foreign material in interpreting domestic bills of rights, particularly when it 
originates from a legal system linked to the domestic one by ties of genealogy and 
history (a genealogical interpretation) or helps judges to better understand and 
express the assumptions behind their own reasoning (dialogical interpretation). 
The four walls doctrine should be understood not as a general injunction 
against the use of comparative constitutional material but, rather, as a rule aimed at 
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ensuring that a foreign legal principle is not applied when it cannot be 
accommodated validly by the text of a bill of rights. That said, the touchstone for 
considering comparative material is whether it is useful in explicating the local bill of 
rights. In this connection, it is interesting that the Privy Council no longer takes the 
narrow (and, in my view, incorrect) interpretive approach that it applied in Ong Ah 
Chuan.132 The issue raised in Reyes v. The Queen,133 an appeal from Belize, was 
whether a mandatory death sentence imposed on the appellant was constitutional. In 
holding that it was not, apart from its own past decisions and those of the Belizean 
courts, the Privy Council referred to cases from Australia, Canada, the European 
Court of Human Rights, Guyana, Jamaica, India, the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights, Mauritius, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States. 
Second, while a constitution or bill of rights may be seen as embodying the 
commitments that define a national identity, which should be shaped only by 
reference to homegrown beliefs and traditions, this view does not require a judge to 
eschew foreign law. Indeed, such comparative material may help one both to 
recognize and to shape the national identity of the country. Of greater significance is 
a perception that domestic bills of rights are best seen as incorporating universal or 
transcendent norms—they are, in this sense, specific applications of general 
principles. Given this is the case, comparative material enables such transcendent 
norms shared by different bills of rights to be sought and understood. 
Third, the concern that foreign bill-of-rights material may be irrelevant to a 
domestic legal system—to the extent that local conditions, social or otherwise, differ 
from conditions in foreign jurisdictions—is minimized if we see foreign law as 
                                                   
132  Supra note 9. 
133  Reyes v. The Queen, [2002] 2 A.C. 235, [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1034 (P.C.) (appeal taken from 
Belize). 
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facilitating the organic development of domestic law, rather than as a source of self-
contained solutions to be transplanted into the domestic legal system. Further, the 
existence of transcendent constitutional norms necessarily implies the possibility of 
referring to comparative material. If a court perceives that local empirical conditions 
justify departing from a transcendent norm, then the onus lies on it to explain why 
this is so. It is not an injunction to shun foreign law altogether. 
Finally, while the choice of foreign law references is necessarily subjective, and 
judges and lawyers may not be fully equipped to understand and evaluate 
comparative legal materials, it is hardly right to characterize the endeavor as 
capricious. The appraisal of foreign legal materials is arguably no more difficult than 
coming to grips with other areas of human experience of which courts and counsel 
have no specialist knowledge. 
Meanwhile, the discussion in this article has hinted at some of the benefits of a 
comparative approach to interpreting bills of rights. I propose to highlight two of 
these. The first is that a judge who encounters a novel constitutional problem in his 
jurisdiction is not compelled to slash his own way through the undergrowth but, by 
referring to foreign material, can gain valuable insights into how other jurisdictions 
have framed the issues and developed solutions.  
Enright v. Ireland,134 a decision of the High Court of Ireland, is a case in point. 
The plaintiff had been convicted of sexual offenses in 1993. Prior to his release from 
prison, the Sex Offenders Act 2001 came into force, obliging such offenders to notify 
the garda authorities within seven days of their release; to furnish their name, date 
of birth, and home address; and to comply with ongoing reporting obligations with 
respect to their whereabouts. The plaintiff sought declarations that various 
                                                   
134  Enright v. Ireland, [2003] 2 I.R. 321 (High Ct.) (Ir.). 
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provisions of the act were unconstitutional, particularly section 7(2), which made the 
Act applicable to persons convicted prior to the Act’s entry into force but released 
after that date. 
The novel issue facing Judge Mary Finlay Geoghegan was whether the 
provisions of the act in question contravened article 38.1 of the Irish Constitution,135 
which states: “No person shall be tried on any criminal charge save in due course of 
law.” In dealing with this issue, two questions had to be answered: first, whether that 
guarantee included the right to be subject to penalty only in accordance with the law 
that existed at the time of a crime’s commission, and, second, whether the impugned 
provisions of the Sex Offenders Act amounted to a criminal penalty. 
As regards the first question, Geoghegan examined various cases from the 
United States and concluded that article 38.1 did indeed prohibit ex post facto 
criminal laws, particularly laws that would subject persons to punishments greater 
than those that existed at the time of their offenses. She said: 
This conclusion I consider to be supported ... by the long standing view of the 
courts in the United States that the prohibition against ex post facto laws 
includes a prohibition against a law which increases the penalty after the date 
of commission of the offense. The unswerving acceptance of such a principle 
which has long historical origins supports the view that this is a long 
recognized and established right in relation to criminal trials in the common 
law world.136 
The judge again turned to U.S. cases to answer the question regarding the 
meaning of “penalty,” observing strong similarities between the principles applied by 
U.S. courts, when considering penalties for the purposes of the prohibition against ex 
post facto laws, and the principles according to which Irish courts considered 
whether or not an offense was a minor offense and whether certain sanctions formed 
                                                   
135  IR. CONST., 1937. 
136  Enright v. Ireland, supra note 134, at 331. 
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part of the penalty or primary punishment for that offense.137 Applying the Supreme 
Court decision in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 138  the judge held that the 
provisions of the Sex Offenders Act were not punitive in nature and hence upheld its 
constitutionality. 
The case demonstrates how a court may benefit from the experience of a 
foreign jurisdiction by applying what was learned there to a novel issue that has 
arisen locally. However, the four walls doctrine and the South African experience 
show that a judge need not adopt the foreign legal principles wholesale—indeed, it 
would be wrong to do so—without closely examining whether these principles fit the 
text of the local bill of rights. It is helpful if we keep in mind three points that John 
Allison has identified if cross-fertilization from one jurisdiction to another is not to 
degenerate into hazardous transplantation: 
1) The doctrinal ramifications—how domestic legal rules and 
doctrines might adapt to the external impetus and whether or how they will 
still fulfill the functions they were meant to fulfill. 
2) How such adaptation might be justified in the legal and political 
theory or theories underpinning the legal system. 
3) How domestic judicial (and, one might add, governmental and 
social) institutions and procedures might cope with the proposed doctrinal 
adaptation.139 
The second benefit of a comparative approach is that it ensures that important 
judgments concerning the fundamental liberties of individuals are made with an eye 
on evolving national and international standards. We have seen how South Africa’s 
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138  Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1962). 
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Constitution requires the courts to have regard for international and foreign law 
specifically to shield the fundamental rights in the Constitution against distortion by 
an oppressive future government. 
Judges should also take into account foreign legal developments, assuming it 
is acknowledged that domestic bills of rights embody transcendental norms. A South 
African case, Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa,140 illustrates 
this point. The applicant in this case was alleged to have been involved in the 
bombing of the U.S. embassy in Dar es Salaam in August 1998. He was indicted in 
the United States, where an arrest warrant was issued against him by the federal 
district court. Arrested by members of the South African Alien Control Unit 
operating in cooperation with U.S. officials, he was transported to the United States 
to stand trial on capital charges. The applicant brought an action claiming that being 
handed over to the United States authorities had infringed his constitutional rights—
the rights to life, to dignity, and not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman, or degrading 
punishment—since South Africa had obtained no prior undertaking from the United 
States that the death penalty, which had been found to be unconstitutional in South 
Africa,141 would not be imposed or carried out. 
The Constitutional Court studied a decision of the Supreme Court of Canada 
holding that to send a person to a state where he would be subject to capital 
punishment without assurances that this penalty would not be imposed on him 
unjustifiably violated principles of fundamental justice.142 It also looked at European 
Court of Human Rights cases establishing that to expel or extradite a person to a 
state when there are substantial grounds for believing that he is in danger of being 
                                                   
140  Mohamed v. President of the Republic of South Africa, 2001 (3) S.A. 893 (C.C.) (S. Afr.). 
141  State v. Makwanyane, supra note 95. 
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subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment there 
violates the European Convention on Human Rights.143 The South African court 
concluded that these cases were consistent with the weight that the Constitution gave 
to the spirit, purport, and purposes of the Bill of Rights and the positive obligation 
that it imposed on the state to “protect, promote and fulfill the rights in the Bill of 
Rights.”144 It agreed, therefore, with the applicant that his removal to the U.S. had 
violated the Constitution and granted various declarations sought by him. 
It is proposed, here, that in Mohamed’s case what the South African 
Constitutional Court did, in effect, was to identify a transcendent norm—namely, the 
prohibition against sending a person to another state where he is likely to be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment. As 
this norm was embodied in the Constitution, the Court was justified in considering 
the implications that foreign courts had ascribed to it. 
This is not to say that a domestic court may not refuse to follow the 
interpretations of transcendent norms prevailing in foreign jurisdictions. However, 
the fact that it proposes to depart from the practices of other democratic nations 
should give the court pause, implicitly asking it to consider why the laws of other 
nations have developed as they have and, further, to identify the material differences 
between those nations and the court’s own jurisdiction that demand a different 
approach. 
Returning to the quotation by von Jhering at the beginning of this article and 
extending the analogy: imagine the judge as a herbalist who seeks a cure for a 
constitutional ailment. To increase the chances of finding the right treatment for the 
                                                   
143  Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. H.R. Rep. 439 (1989) (Eur. Ct. H.R.); Chahal v. U.K., 23 Eur. H.R. Rep. 
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patient, the sensible herbalist will gather a selection of herbs from a variety of 
locations. It is only prudent to scrutinize all the plants to determine whether or not 
there are any noxious weeds among them. However, once he has ascertained that a 
plant can indeed provide an efficacious cure, he would be foolish to reject it to his 
patient’s detriment merely because it was not found in his own garden. 
